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6	DD/A				
7	DD/O		X		
8	DD/S&T		X		
9	GC				
10	LC				
11	IG				
12	Compt		X		
13	D/PA				
14	D/EEO				
15	D/Pers				
16	AO/DCI				
17	C/IPS				
18	NSC/C		X		
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SUSPENSE DATE:

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Remarks:

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(Security Classification)

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TO:	NAME AND ADDRESS	DATE	INITIALS
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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

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ATTACHMENT

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December 2, 1980

MEMORANDUM FOR:

The Secretary of State  
The Secretary of the Treasury  
The Secretary of Defense  
The Director, Office of Management and Budget  
Director, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency  
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff  
Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT: PRC(I) Meeting of November 6, 1980 (C)

Attached for your information is the Summary of Conclusions from the PRC(I) meeting chaired by Admiral Stansfield Turner which was held on Thursday, November 6, 1980. (C)

*Carole Farrar*  
Christine Dodson *for*  
Staff Secretary

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Review on December 2, 1981

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POLICY REVIEW COMMITTEE (INTELLIGENCE)

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NOVEMBER 6, 1980

Time and Place: 9:30 A.M. - 10:45 A.M., White House Situation Room

Subject: Budget

Participants:

State

Secretary Edmund Muskie  
 David Newsom, Under Secretary  
 for Political Affairs  
 Ronald Spiers, Director, Bureau  
 of Intelligence and Research

OSD

DEPSEC W. Graham Claytor, Jr.  
 Gerald P. Dinneen, Assistant  
 SECDEF (Communications Command  
 Control & Intelligence)  
 Admiral Daniel Murphy, Deputy  
 UNDERSEC for Policy Review

Treasury

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Secretary William Miller  
 Foster Collins, Special Assistant  
 to the Secretary for National  
 Security

OMB

Mr. James McIntyre, Director  
 John White, Deputy Director, OMB  
 Edward Sanders, Assistant Director  
 for National Security & Intelli-  
 gence Affairs

ACDA

Dr. Manfred Eimer, Verifica-  
 tion Group  
 Dr. James Timbie, Deputy  
 Assistant Director, ISP

White House

David Aaron, Dep Assistant to  
 the President for National  
 Security Affairs

NSC

Donald Gregg, NSC Staff Member  
 for Intelligence  
 Michael A. Berta, NSC Staff Memk  
 for Intelligence (Notetaker)

DCI

Adm Stansfield Turner, Chairman  
 Frank Carlucci, Dep Director  
 for Central Intelligence

JCS

NSC

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General John Pustay, Assistant  
 to the Chairman

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Derivative CI by Multiple Sources  
 Review on: November 6, 2000  
 Extended by: Z. Brzezinski  
 Reason: NSC 1.13(e)

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SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS

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
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The DCI opened the meeting with an overview of the agenda items.   for Resource Management, explained the method of structuring the Zero Base Budget ranking, which was to first put real growth in the Non-National Reconnaissance Program (NRP) part of the National Foreign Intelligence Program (NFIP). (TS  )

David Aaron raised the issue of the proliferation of technical collection systems. He felt that we needed a rich HUMINT collection system and a broader analytical base, but couldn't seem to obtain funding for the program because of the juggernaut pace of development of the technical collection systems. (TS)

NRO  
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Defense felt that collection systems were important and helped a great deal in many crisis areas such as Afghanistan. (TS)



NRO

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The DCI then raised the issue of the funding level for the NFIP. Defense and JCS supported   OMB declined to comment on the level, but did observe that at some point money must be a factor. (S)

The DCI raised the issue of inflation. Defense argued that the inflation rate was higher than being allowed by OMB and grossly understated in high technology areas and weapons acquisition. OMB said the inflation rate was a technical issue and they would be receptive to any data. OMB said they were not arguing against real growth in the NFIP. (U)

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
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
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The DCI raised the issue of Covert Action. David Aaron reiterated his concerns on inadequate priorities in this area and said he NRO  
did not understand why it was put outside the budget in the 25X1  
first place. A consensus developed to include Covert Action in  
the Basic Budget level. (TS)



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The DCI raised the issue of the NSA Operations Building. David Aaron stated he believed there was a need for a building and suggested putting it in the Defense Military Construction Budget. Defense said that they had taken such an approach with the new DIA building and Congress put it into the NFIP. Defense felt we should sequentially fund the building. A consensus developed to fund the project. OMB, however, raised the issue of survivability

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and too much concentration of NSA operations at Ft Meade. Defense said that NSA was sensitive to that problem. That was the reason for building a remote site [REDACTED] instead of Washington. (S) 25X1A

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NSC

[REDACTED] ACDA stated that such a capability was needed for treaty monitoring purposes. The DCI said there was no system start in the budget. Defense added that several proposals were being considered now and that we should defer a decision pending more analysis of the alternatives. There was general agreement on this point. (S) [REDACTED] NRO 25X1

The DCI raised the issue of MODE and asked for a description of the problem. The DDCI said that no one argued with the intent of MODE, but that the process had become overly bureaucratic. He felt that MODE ceilings should be set by the budget process and not by an external system. The DDCI said that even when people were approved in the budget he could not get MODE to work. Defense agreed and used the recent NSC interest in Central America and the Caribbean as an example. Defense said people and money weren't the problem, but they had difficulty supporting the NSC request because of the MODE bureaucracy. There was misunderstanding which no one could clarify as to how MODE ceilings were established or changed. OMB agreed to address the issue in the budget process with the agencies, and to clarify the procedures. (C)

The DCI then asked for general comments:

- Secretary Muskie said he agreed with David Aaron's opening remarks. He said he realized that he could not make specific judgments, but appreciated the importance of good intelligence from human sources. (U) ✓
- The JCS requested assistance for the procurement of additional U-2R aircraft - 2 in FY 81 and 2 in FY 82. State asked for an elaboration of the problem. The JCS said attrition was causing a loss of aircraft. One crashed recently. Given the commitment to support verifying the Egyptian-Israeli Treaty, the fleet was overstressed. (S)

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